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In the past three years, major attacks on mass transportation in Moscow, Madrid, 
London, and Mumbai left hundreds dead, thousands injured and the world searching for 
answers.  Subway systems are not only attractive targets, but evidence persists of a 
continued terrorist interest in conducting attacks on United States subways and railways.  
An attack on a subway or rail system in the United States could cause substantial loss of 
life and could have an adverse impact on public confidence, resulting in massive 
economic loss. 
This thesis examines a series of security initiatives that collectively comprise a 
plan to be used as a template for mass transit systems in the United States that operate a 
subway to augment security.  The core goal of these initiatives identifies ways to increase 
the probability of early detection to prevent terrorist bombings of all types on United 
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Three types of terrorist attacks have occurred globally and will likely impact on 
the United States in the near future.1  Considering all three types of terrorism, 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) would be most concerned 
with suicide terrorism or bombings that represent a deliberate lethal attack against the 
public on buses, trains, and subways.  Terrorists seek asymmetric means to penetrate our 
defenses and exploit the openness of our society to their advantage.  This tactic includes 
targeting mass transit, explicitly designed to be available and open to the public.   
Mass transportation has been and remains an attractive target for terrorist activity 
throughout the world.  In the last three years, major attacks in England, Russia, Spain and 
most recently India onboard subway systems left hundreds dead, thousands injured and 
the world searching for answers.  The problem facing United States mass transit police 
departments is vast.  Between 1989 and July 2006, more than 225 terrorist attacks 
occurred against surface transportation worldwide.  About one-third of all terrorist 
incidents worldwide target transportation systems.2  The impact of terrorism on mass 
transportation is calculated with lives.  With this in mind, it is necessary to examine 
terrorist bombings on surface transportation worldwide to determine how the SEPTA 
Transit Police Department can reduce the impact of terrorist bombings on the 
Philadelphia subway system.  SEPTA’s mass transit system not only represents an 
attractive target, but research indicates that of nearly 1,000 terrorist incidents of all kinds, 
attacks on transportation are among the most likely to result in death.3  SEPTA provides 
transportation service to approximately 316,000,000 commuters per year.4  Service 
                                                 
1 Bruce Hoffman, “Defending America Against Suicide Terrorism,” Three Years After, Next Steps in 
the War on Terror, ed.  David Aaron (Santa Monica: Rand, 2005), 21.     
2 Jim Turner, America at Risk: Closing the Public Transportation Security Gap (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2004), 1. 
3 Brian Michael Jenkins, Terrorism and the Security of Public Transportation  (Washington D.C.: 
RAND Corporation, 2004), 1. 




includes 137 bus routes, subway elevated, light rail, trackless trolley and commuter 
railroad routes.  Preventing terrorist incidents and reducing SEPTA’s vulnerability to 
terrorist attack is paramount to providing safe and effective transportation service to the 
region.   
This thesis addresses terrorist attacks that are frequent and smaller in scale on 
public surface transportation and that are devastating to the psyche of the American 
public.  The success of previous attacks on mass transit throughout the world requires the 
development of a hybrid plan that incorporates varied initiatives and draws on the 
community, transit employees, police and the intelligence community to prevent 
terrorism.  Implementing such a plan reduces the probability of bombings on subway 
systems. 
This thesis examines why subway systems need a new plan to deal with terrorist 
bombings.  This new plan must analyze what is wrong with the current security situation 
on United States subway systems and examine the principles and techniques that will 
augment security on subway systems.  In addition, this thesis looks at the problems 
inherent in creating the new plan and what the new plan will look like.  A thorough 
evaluation will be launched to develop recommended courses of action for public safety 
executives charged with securing United States subway systems. 
 
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis has several objectives.  The first objective develops a security strategy 
for major United States mass transportation providers to prevent terrorist bombings on 
subway systems.  A key step toward achieving this objective involves identifying 
vulnerabilities of subway systems in the United States.   
The second objective examines the psychological underpinnings of suicide 
terrorism targeting civilian populations.  Knowing how an enemy thinks serves a 
defensive force well in securing crucial areas such as mass transportation.  A behavioral 
matrix that examines a terrorist bomber’s behavior and actions, rather than physical 
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appearance, permits United States mass transit agencies to follow a methodology that is 
rooted in actions rather than appearances in an effort to defeat terrorism. 
A third objective establishes sound patrol tactics and techniques for transit police 
that focuses on the behavioral aspects of terrorists.  Utilizing an innovative procedure of 
behavioral observation screening system (BOSS), transit police are poised to evaluate 
behavior as an indicator of terrorist behavior and interdict an act of terror prior to its 
commission. 
Finally, the fourth objective and, perhaps, the most important, involve 
improvements in the use of intelligence in defeating terrorism.  Without reliable, 
aggressive, and effective intelligence working to identify precursors of a terrorist attack, 
our society may suffer immense and unsustainable losses.  Intelligence collection, 
analysis, interpretation, and dissemination serve as a prelude to vigorous intervention into 
possible attacks on mass transit.  Human intelligence can be developed by incorporating 
the customers of a mass transit system, its employees, and its transit police officers.  The 
core goal of these intelligence activities identifies the probability of early detention and 
prevents terrorist bombings of all types on United States subway systems.   
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The analytical framework for this study draws on previous SEPTA policies and 
comparative case studies of mass transit systems that have experienced bombings.  In 
addition to comparative case studies, the solutions set forth are compared in a cost benefit 
analysis.  The solutions determine which recommendations can offer both savings and 
normal crime reduction, as well as what is best for SEPTA.  The thesis also focuses on 
the ability of the public to work with police to reduce terrorism.  The thesis examines 
whether and how incidents such as subway bombings may be prevented by including 
greater participation to identify potential terrorists and to interdict them prior to their 
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II. SURFACE TRANSPORTATION VULNERABILITIES 
Surface transportation remains extremely difficult to secure.  Unlike aviation 
security, confined to a centrally-located and secure access area, surface transportation 
consists of a multitude of vehicles, facilities and related infrastructures.  The SEPTA 
mass-transit system, for instance, consists of over 2,220 linear miles in Philadelphia, 
Bucks, Chester, Delaware and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, as well as parts of 
New Jersey and Delaware.  SEPTA’s assets include, but are not limited to, trains, 
trolleys, subways, buses, railways lines, streets, stations, depots, control facilities, 
bridges, and tunnels.  This diverse array of systems provides essential support for 
everyday life and the national economy.  SEPTA serves a region that is the midway point 
of the northeast United States corridor.  A successful attack would fracture the system’s 
ability to handle travel between Washington D.C. and New York. 
Unfortunately, because surface mass transit is difficult to protect, it receives the 
least amount of attention in federal oversight and funding.  Aviation security receives the 
highest priority within efforts to secure transportation systems.  However, surface 
transportation systems are, by their nature, much more difficult to secure.  Surface 
transportation systems require openness and accessibility and have thousands of entry 
points.  With respect to surface transit, key assets are distributed over a wide area. 
Interlocks, power distribution centers, and routes are fixed by way of rail, and service is 
reliable and dependable for both commuters and terrorists.  In order to conduct an attack 
on surface transit, particularly subway systems, terrorists do not have to employ costly 
and time-consuming training.  They merely pay the transit fare.  SEPTA’s base fare 
currently costs less than $2.00.  The National Planning Scenarios, developed to aid   
federal, state, and local authorities prepare for attacks, recognizes in scenario #12 that an 
attack on a subway system would devastate the American public.  National Planning 
Scenario #12 outlines suicide bombers onboard a subway station during a sports event 
and carrying large amounts of people.  It assumes that the public transportation line will 
be closed for one week, with the station closed for three weeks for evidence collection, 
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decontamination, cleanup, and structural assessment.5  The economic impact of the attack 
would cost millions in repairs and lost revenue, and public trust would be shattered.   
Fully protecting surface transportation is impossible; however, the recognition 
that a certain amount of uncertainty and risk is unavoidable should not be cause for 
resignation.  By learning from past attacks and collecting intelligence on future threats, 
we can apply security measures that reduce the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack.  
For example, the London Underground, Madrid, and Mumbai train bombings 
demonstrate that attacks on subway systems include multiple attacks in close proximity 
of time and geographic location to cripple a region’s transportation system and to 
influence the civilian population.  
 
A. FUNDING FOR SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
Aviation security remains virtually the sole focus of Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) spending.  Ninety percent of the President’s FY2006 budget 
request for TSA ($4.98 billion out of $5.56 billion) is allocated for civil aviation 
programs, to the detriment of other transportation security priorities.  In addition, aviation 
security workers account for 97 percent of TSA’s total workforce.6  The FY2006 budget 
request for homeland security-related spending provides almost 65 percent of total federal 
transportation security funds for aviation, just over 23 percent for maritime security, 
about 11 percent for multi-modal applications and only 1.4 percent for surface 
transportation.   
Due to TSA’s disproportionate funding of aviation security, surface transportation 
providers are fighting a difficult battle when it comes to securing transportation assets in 
the United States, especially given the scope and scale of mass transit and the small 
amount of funds with which to protect it.  The recent attacks on mass transit (Moscow, 
Madrid, London, and Mumbai) and historical examinations of terrorist attacks are 
                                                 
5 United States Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Council, National Planning 
Scenarios: Created for Use in National, Federal, State and Local, Homeland Security Preparedness 
Activities (April 2005)Version 20.1. 
6  FY2006 TSA Budget Request  (Washington, D.C.: Transportation Security Administration) 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0613.xml [Accessed June 10, 2006]. 
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contrary to the Department of Homeland Security’s threat-based models of protection.  
The establishment of Homeland Security emerged from the tragedy of September 11 and 
the threats to aviation.    
An April 2004 survey of mass transit systems by the American Public 
Transportation Association reported a shortfall of $6 billion in security-related funding 
needs.  This shortfall included $5.2 billion in capital investments and $800 million per 
year for personnel and other security-related expenses.  The same survey highlighted a 
number of areas for which federal funding was “very important” including security, 
personnel, training, communications, and monitoring equipment and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) detection devices.7   
 
B.  FEDERAL FUNDING PRIORITIES 
The nation’s mass transit subway systems need to address security.  The 
Department of Homeland Security pumps resources into aviation, while land 
transportation flounders for direction and resources.  This thesis addresses shortcomings 
in the current manner in which homeland security addresses the nation’s mass transit 
providers, and it promotes a sound strategy consistent with the freedoms and rights 
shared by all Americans.   
Since September 11, 2001, the United States public transit industry spent more 
than $2 billion on security measures, but the federal government only allocated $386 
million towards transit security.  In contrast, the aviation industry received more than $20 
billion for aviation security during the same period.8 
DHS established funding priorities designed to augment transit security.  The 
DHS Secretary prioritized the research and development of “next-generation” detection 
                                                 
7 American Public Transportation Association, Survey of United States Transit System Security Needs 
and Funding Priorities, Summary of Findings  (April 2004), 4-5. 
8 American Public Transportation Association. “Senate Should Increase Transit Security Funding This 
Week,”  News Release, July 10, 2006, www.apta.com [Accessed July 10, 2006]. 
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equipment for explosives, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.9  However, DHS 
provides no guidance on what types of detector technology to purchase or how to develop 
a matrix for reducing a threat by implementing specific security measures.  The 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff argues that security cannot 
be pursued “at any price” but must be consistent with “Americans’ freedom, prosperity, 
mobility and individual privacy.”10  If so much security is added into a transit system that 
it becomes “dysfunctional” in its basic purpose of moving a large number of people 
rapidly and inexpensively, “we have lost the war.”11  Disturbingly, Secretary Chertoff 
also told the Associated Press that a transit attack “may kill 30 people” and does not 
“pose catastrophic consequences” to the United States.12  Chertoff’s statements run 
contrary to data on recent deaths from subway bombings in Madrid, London, and 
Mumbai, India, where 444 died.  These bombings averaged 148 deaths per incident.  
Consistent with al Qaeda’s strategic objectives, an attack on a major metropolitan transit 
hub—such as SEPTA’s Suburban Station that transports over 40,000 people during a 
normal Monday to Friday morning rush hour—would devastate.  Suburban Station also 
houses over a dozen restaurants and other businesses and serves as the “basement level” 
for the major high-rise buildings in Philadelphia.  An attack on mass transit in this 
location poses a catastrophic consequence to the region and the national psyche.   
 
C. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION ON SUBWAY BOMBINGS 
Since September 11, the United States has focused on large-scale terrorist attacks, 
with or without weapons of mass destruction.  However, we must also acknowledge the 
disruptive potential of relatively small-scale incidents.  A small-scale attack, such as the 
ones in London on July 7 and July 21, 2005, paralyzes a city and causes major disruption.  
During the first bombing incidents on July 7 in London, total disruption to mass transit 
                                                 
9  Federico Cura, “Transit Industry Prepares for Anniversary of Sept. 11 With Increased Security,” 
Passenger Transport, vol. 86 (September 9, 2002): 28. 
10 “America Still Unprepared-America Still in Danger,” Report of an Independent Task Force 
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, co-chairs, Stephen E.  
Flynn, project director (2002). 
11 “Mr.  Chertoff’s Challenge,” Washington Post editorial, July 14, 2005, A-24. 
12 “One Person’s Catastrophe,” New York Times editorial, July 16, 2005, 14. 
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lasted over 24 hours.  Subsequent false alarms of additional bombings and suspicious 
packages led to an average of ten closures (of stations or lines) per day during the 
following week.  Portions of the Underground transit system were not open until the first 
week in August.13  A similar situation developed during the second set of attacks on July 
21 when the entire mass-transit system shut down.  The attacks also caused a degree of 
panic among some political leaders.  Because of these attacks, the United States and other 
countries immediately increased security on subway and bus systems, though the chance 
that terrorists would attack using similar tactics across countries was minimal.  Should 
similar events occur in the United States, we will no doubt duplicate the reactions of the 
United Kingdom.  Transit agencies will move to augment security forces, deploy officers 
in tactical equipment, increase presence of canine patrols, and, in some jurisdictions, 
check suspicious bags and passengers.   
This author examined past terrorist incidents, policies and procedures that other 
countries have experienced on mass transit.  These policy recommendations serve as a 
template for securing the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority and other 
major surface transportation providers.  The recent bombings in London and the Israeli 
experience with terrorism received particular attention.  Comparing democratic societies 
affected by terrorism on mass transit will enable United States law-enforcement officials 
to draw a best practices methodology for securing interests.  SEPTA must develop a 
model to prevent terrorist bombings that accounts for United States laws, intelligence 
gathering and dissemination of potential precursor activity to terrorism.   
Whether in London, Madrid, the United States, or elsewhere, the general public 
most clearly feels the impact of subway attacks.  The ability to thwart terrorist attacks 
requires an expanded and more effective way to use and incorporate intelligence gathered 
from those same individual passengers and stakeholders in mass transit.  In the chapters 
to follow, this thesis examines ways in which the community, employees, police, and 
specialized police tactics can develop and put forth an effective strategy for preventing 
terrorist bombings on United States subway systems.  First, however, we must understand 
                                                 
13 Michael Bowron, (Assistant Commissioner, City of London Police), interview by author, November 
15, 2005. 
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the psychology of terrorism and, in particular, suicide terrorism as it affects surface 
transportation throughout the world.  The psychological dimensions of terrorist attacks 
are critical to understanding how they are organized and implemented and the 
consequences of the damages on the public.   
11
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL MINDSET OF THE TERRORIST 
A. SUICIDE TERRORISM  
Secular and religious groups alike utilize suicide terrorism as an effective tactic to 
promote their agendas.  Terrorists employ suicide-bombing tactics to attack mass transit 
throughout the world, particularly the attacks in Madrid and in London.  This chapter 
focuses on suicide terrorism, and on what can be done to eliminate the tactic from 
potential terrorist scenarios.  Obtaining background information on the psychological 
aspects of suicide terror is critical for SEPTA police to interdict suicide terrorism at its 
root.  Early interdiction of pre-incident indicators is crucial to the success of preventing 
terrorist attacks on United States mass transit systems.  Pre-incident indicators are the 
focus of a subsequent chapter and include a system entitled Behavioral Observation 
Screening System (BOSS).  BOSS uses behavior of pre-incident activity in an effort to 
disrupt a potential attack in its earliest stages.  While this chapter works to recognize the 
behavior of terrorists and provides a mechanism for interdicting terrorist activity, this 
thesis is limited to open source information and does not take into account top-secret 
tactics of pre-incident indicators of terrorism.   
Whatever the reasons for suicide terrorism, secular or religious, the globalization 
of commerce, travel and information transfer, which puts economic disparity and 
ideological competition in sharp relief, certainly plays a role in the increase of suicide 
terrorism.14  Jean Twenge, a psychology professor from San Diego State University, 
compiled data from 1.3 million respondents spanning six decades.  The findings indicate 
that young Americans are more narcissistic and self-centered than their parents and 
individuals in the baby boom generation.15  This outlook appears in stark contrast to the 
views of Muslim society that set family and tribal needs far above that of the individual.   
 
 
                                                 
14 Jean Twenge, Generation Me: Why Today's Young Americans Are More Confident, Assertive, 
Entitled—and  More Miserable than Ever Before  (Toronto: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 36. 
15  Ibid, 22. 
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With that in mind, the focus should be on how American or western society can 
better understand the roots of a terrorist mindset in order to develop policies to manage 
the risk of suicide terrorism.16  
An analysis of terrorist behaviors is necessary to understand the appropriate 
methodology for screening terrorists in United States subway systems.  The current 
method to randomly select individuals at random subway stations is ineffective.  Current 
screening models are based on United States tactics for dealing with drunk driving, which 
seek to screen for an impaired driver at a pre-determined point.  This tactic is not even 
successful in stopping a drunk driver, since the impaired individual is already behind the 
wheel when stopped by police.  Screening and subway security are connected.  Screening 
is too often wrongly based on profiles and characteristics.  However, subway screening 
should be based on behavior and evidence.  One problem with profile-based screening is 
the wrong assumptions about the motivations and characteristics of terrorists.  Mass 
transit providers want to adopt a better understanding of the motivations for terrorism to 
lead to different and more effective types of screening. 
1. Suicide Terrorism — Psychological Defect or Altruism 
Understanding the motivations and factors that drive terrorists is crucial to 
develop effective strategies and tactics to screen out potential terrorists.  Many suicide 
terrorists have motivations fundamentally different from those that drive the prevailing 
type of suicide, and would more than likely not commit suicide without these underlying 
altruistic motivations.  Over 100 years ago, Emile Durkheim defined the phenomenon of 
suicide as comprising four categories: altruistic, egoistic, anomic, and fatalistic.17  
Madsen indicates that research of the Japanese Kamikaze point out that these individuals 
were not suicidal, but rather viewed self-sacrifice as the ultimate weapon against a 
powerful enemy.18  In the past 30 years, society has awakened to the reasons behind 
suicide terrorism.  Previously, research focused on mental defects or psychological 
                                                 
16 Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 3.  
17 Antoon A. Leenaars, “Altruistic Suicide: From Sainthood to Terrorism,” Archives of Suicide 
Research 8, no.  1 (2004): 89. 
18 Julian Madsen, “Suicide Terrorism: Rationalizing the Irrational,” Strategic Insights III, no.  8 
(August 2004): 77. 
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disorders as the base cause of suicide terrorism.  A 2001 Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) report, “on the psychology and sociology of terrorism stated that these people are 
perfectly sane.”19  While many scholars have produced research that show that suicide 
terrorists are not mentally deficient or psychopathic, debate continues over what 
motivates an individual to become a suicide terrorist.  Therefore, we must find a reason 
why individuals and terrorist groups support suicide terrorism.   
In an examination of Chechen suicide terrorists, Oleg Nechiporenko, head of the 
Russian National Anti-Crime and Anti-Terrorism Fund concluded, “Chechens live in 
such a violent and tense environment that many become obsessed with getting revenge on 
Russian troops and those who support them, even at the cost of their own lives.”20  While 
revenge seems to be a rational explanation for suicide terrorism, for the actual bomber, 
other schools of thought exist.  For instance, one view emphasizes the perceived lack of 
alternatives.  The bombers perceive they have no place else to go and nothing else to do 
except to become a suicide terrorist to prevent their family from experiencing additional 
trauma in society.  Abu Tawahina, executive director of the Gaza Community Health 
Program, believes suicide terrorism is an outgrowth of Palestinian normal life where “the 
whole population is lacking a feeling of security.  They are not safe at home; 
school…work…or anywhere.”21  Hence, individuals turn to suicide terrorism to improve 
their family and friends’ lot in life in an altruistic suicide as previously described by 
Durkheim.   
Suicide terrorism grows out of a necessity based on few prospects in life, 
especially those entrenched in poverty or of a unique group dynamic, and that promotes 
the self-sacrifice for greater good of the whole.  A review of past incidents shows the 
groups that commit suicide terrorism missions are both hard-core Islamic extremists and 
secular groups promoting a political agenda.  Research conducted by Scott Atran 
strengthens this point.  The specific ways in which suicide bombers are recruited reflect 
                                                 
19 Josie Glausiusz, “The Surprise of Suicide Terrorism,” Discover 33, vol. 24, no. 10 (October 2003): 
46. 
20 Nabi Abdullaev, “Russian Suicide Bombings,” Cdi Russia Weekly, 265, www.cdi.org/russia/265-
10.cfm/.[Accessed July 16, 2003]. 
21 Abu Tawahina, “Psychology Around the World: Two Tales of Woe,” Monitor on Psychology 33, 
no.  9 (October 2002): 28. 
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the social forces that influence or motivate suicide terrorism.  They capitalize on the 
popularity of martyrs among the young that romanticizes sacrifice for the cause.  They 
ingrain suicide terrorism as a cultural value into societies.  Statements made by spiritual 
leaders throughout the radical Muslim community declare, “He who commits martyrdom 
sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation.  The Mujahed is full of 
hope.”22  Since terrorists who use suicide-bombing tactics, favored in mass transit 
bombings, possess various motivations and backgrounds—male and female, religious and 
secular, political and ideological—screening tactics that utilize behavior rather than 
cultural and ethnic differences are preferred.  
2. Suicide Terrorism — Who Delivers? 
Research into suicide terrorism biographies indicates that terrorists can be college 
educated or uneducated, married or single, male or female or socially isolated or 
integrated. Their age ranges from 15 to as old as 52.  Regarding the actual perpetrators of 
suicide attacks, the number of female suicide bombers has increased in recent years.  In 
particular, the LTTE’s, Chechen “Black Widows” and female suicide terrorists 
increasingly participate in Islamic Extremist Terrorism.  Daniel Wei covers the utility of 
women in conducting suicide missions.  He notes, “About 30-40% of LTTE’s overall 
suicide missions are conducted by women with great success.”23  Chechen Black Widow 
Suicide Terrorist (female) groups are responsible for killing individuals at rock concerts, 
a Moscow theater, and the subway, dispelling the stereotype that only males commit 
suicide terrorism.  Hence, the physical profiling of suicide terrorists is not applicable.  
Females who look non-Arab and have no religious cause commit suicide missions are 
joined by the young man, 19-25 years of age, who comes from a devout Muslim family.  
“He would be unmarried and the middle child of a large family…  [he] would have lived 
in refugee camps, especially in Gaza, and may have had a father or brother killed in the 
Intifada.”24  Based on research, the most effective method for conducting screening uses 
behavioral indicators and pre-incident indicators to disrupt an attack at its earliest stages. 
                                                 
22 Sheikh YussufAl-Qaradhawi, Al-Ahram Al-Arabi (Cairo) February 3, 2001. 
23 Daniel Tan Kuan Wei, “The Fatal Attraction of Suicide Terrorism,” Journal of the Singapore 
Armed Forces, vol. 29, no. 4 (October-December 2003): 5. 
24 Harvey Gordon, “The ‘Suicide’ Bomber: Is it a Psychiatric Phenomenon?” Psychiatric Bulletin 8 
(2002): 285.  
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3. Suicide Terrorism: The Success of an Attack 
Many points of view exist about why suicide terrorism remains so successful and 
produces such heavy casualties.  “From 1980 to 2001, suicide attacks worldwide 
reportedly represented only three percent of all terrorist attacks but accounted for 48 
percent of total deaths due to terrorism.”25  Intensive media coverage of the daily results 
of suicide terrorism in Iraq ensures that the American people understand that suicide 
terrorism is a tactic that is being widely deployed.  Tactical advantage “guarantees that 
the attack will be carried out at the most appropriate time and place with regards to the 
circumstances at the target location.”26  Cost effectiveness reflects bombs that are cheap 
to make and deploy.  “A willing young man…nails, gunpowder, a light switch and a short 
cable, mercury, acetone…the most expensive item is the transportation to the Israeli 
town.  The total cost is about $150 dollars.”27  James Brekenridge and Phillip Zimbardo 
point out that acts of terrorism create a disproportionate fear due to the underlying 
psychology that overvalues emotional, negative threats or risks.28  Societies see attacks in 
the media, and the repetition of the attack wears on the psyche.  In the public’s mind, we 
are more susceptible to an attack than we actually may be.  Success of a suicide attack 
directly relates to the point that martyrdom is often a cultural norm of radical Islamic 
society.  The media contributes by replaying and reliving a terrorist event.  Although we 
may know why suicide terrorism works, the question often left unanswered in research 
examines the ways and means to stop suicide terrorism from encroaching on our soil. 
4. Terrorist Behavior 
All too often Islamic extremists (terrorists) are portrayed as unpredictable, 
irrational, bloodthirsty individuals determined to kill infidels no matter what the cost.  
This stereotype is often perpetuated by the media and becomes the focus of the attack.  In 
reality, terrorism reflects a calculated effort by a group with particular political, social, or 
religious goals.  Law enforcement gains insight to prevent terrorist behavior by observing 
                                                 
25 Julian Madsen, “Suicide Terrorism: Rationalizing the Irrational.” 
26Daniel Tan Kuan Wei, “The Fatal Attraction of Suicide Terrorism.” 
27 Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science, vol. 299, no. 5612 (March 7, 2003): 1537. 
28 James N. Brekenridge and Phillip G. Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of 
Mass Mediated Fear,” Naval Postgraduate School, CHDS, Model Course NS4133, http:www.chds.us 
[Accessed  June  3, 2006]. 
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human behavior and group dynamics, including stress, excitement, and social isolation.  
Much as a Las Vegas card player develops various “tells,” indicators to deception are 
present when suicide terrorists are dispatched.  While no single profile for terrorists 
exists, some traits are common to many terrorists groups.  We must exploit these traits to 
our advantage to protect the mass-transit system in the United States.  The next three sub-
sections dispel stereotypes and support the view that behavioral profiling represents a 
more reliable indicator of terrorist activity than physical characteristics and perceptions.  
a. Socio-economic Status 
The media and cinema frequently portray terrorists as low economic 
standing, poorly-educated individuals, much like American gang members.  Marc 
Sageman, a senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and former CIA case 
officer in Afghanistan, conducted a study of 400 Islamic terrorists. He discovered that 75 
percent come from the upper or middle class and 90 percent come from caring, intact, 
functional families.29  This research proved true for the majority of the September 11, 
2001, terrorists, as well as Osama Bin Laden.   
b. Gender 
Terrorism is not a male dominated field.  LTTE and Chechen Black 
Widows demonstrate that terrorism is an equal opportunity event.  Some exceptions exist, 
particularly with respect to Islamic religious zealots who subjugate women and preclude 
their participation in terrorist events and society as a whole.  Al Qaeda does not support 
the use of female terrorist activity.  However, the Tamil Tigers use young children of 
both genders to carry out terrorist attacks on unsuspecting targets.30  
c. Appearance 
For decades, criminologists attempted to categorize a criminal’s 
appearance.  Alphonse Bertillion, a French law enforcement officer and biometrics 
researcher, created anthropometry, an identification system based on physical 
measurements.  Bertillion’s methods failed, as do today’s attempts to categorize terrorists 
                                                 
29 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004), 
3. 
30 Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Charateristics” (lecture, International 
Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism , ICT, Herzeliya, Israel, February 21, 2000), 
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=112 [Accessed June 4, 2005]. 
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by appearance.  Terrorists are racially diverse.  In a group such as al Qaeda, which span 
the entire Arabian Peninsula and Northern Africa, the “profiling appearance” is not a 
viable solution.  As a result, prevention efforts must emphasize the behavior of a terrorist 
and not stereotype appearance. 
5. Summary 
In this chapter, I examined the psychological underpinnings of terrorist activity.  
As has been discovered there is no one psychological profile, model or reason why 
individuals use suicide terrorism to accomplish an objective.  More importantly, there is 
no physical attribute that makes someone a terrorist, nor can all individuals be classified 
as a terrorist based on race or ethnicity.  In the next chapter, I will examine an alternative 
approach to identifying terrorists— one not using appearances— rather based on 
behavior that can be implemented and become an effective method to combat terrorist 
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IV. CURRENT POLICING RESPONSE TO SUICIDE 
TERRORISM 
We cannot explain why suicide terrorism has not been used as a method of attack 
in the United States (except for 9/11).  However, local forces are always stronger than 
those coming in from the outside.  Local forces need to exhibit determination to fight 
terrorism and need to assist external forces in fighting within their own jurisdiction.  The 
SEPTA Transit Police Department needs to establish methods and procedures to prevent 
and respond to active suicide terrorist events before the global tactic is used on United 
States soil.  The behavioral observation screening system (BOSS) represents a 
preemptive strategy to train police officers.  Law enforcement must assume the new role 
of “security official.”  The security official must respond to threat assessments, often 
using less reliable information than traditionally used by police to justify arrest or 
detention under the Fourth Amendment.  This new paradigm involves police taking an 
innovative approach to law enforcement.  Police and employees must act proactively to 
develop intelligence on threats, seek out suspicious persons and take action, rather than 
wait for a crime.  They must deny access to secure areas based on behavior and screen for 
an individual or groups intent on attack.   
 
A. NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS 
If transit police agencies continue to use old methods where resources are devoted 
to the vast majority of passengers who are low risk, consideration will not be given to 
high-risk passengers.  The issue of terrorist bombings will not be resolved.  The current 
method used by the New York Police Department to randomly screen passengers on the 
New York Subway have not been proven effective.  The core argument of conducting 
searches on mass transit in the United States reflects the Fourth Amendment, and 
unreasonable search and seizure.  The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution states, “'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
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Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”31 
 
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
The Fourth Amendment has undergone great transformation since its inception by 
the Founding Fathers.  Early cases held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable only 
when a search was undertaken for criminal investigatory purposes.32  Until recently, the 
Supreme Court employed a reasonableness test for such searches without requiring either 
a warrant or probable cause in the absence of a warrant.33  The ability of transportation 
officials to conduct random searches was affected by a 1967 court decision in which the 
Court held in two cases that administrative inspections to detect building code violations 
must be undertaken pursuant to warrant if the occupant objects.34  ''We may agree that a 
routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion 
than the typical police officer’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.  
Nevertheless, we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these 
inspection cases are merely 'peripheral.'  It is surely anomalous to say that the individual 
and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the 
individual is suspected of criminal behavior.''35 
Certain administrative inspections utilized to enforce regulatory schemes with 
regard to such items as alcohol and firearms are, however, exempt from the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement, and may be authorized simply by statute.36  The 
position of the Authority initiating subway searches would also likely argue that it meets 
a "special need" for preventing terrorism.  Special needs are exceptions allowed by the 
courts for citizens to exercise various privileges under the law.  Examples allowed by the 
                                                 
31 The U.S. Constitution,  http://www.usconstitution.net/const.htm [Accessed April 2004]. 
32 Strouse, 23 Fed. Cas. 261 (No. 13,548) (D. Nev. 1871); Meador, 16 Fed. Cas. 1294, 1299 (No.  
9375) (N.D. Ga. 1869).   
33 Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Oklahoma Press Pub.  
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).   
34 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.  541 (1967).   
35 Ibid.   
36  Colonnade Catering Corp. v. U.S., 397 U.S.72 (1970); U.S. v.  Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
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courts include random testing of student athletes or participants in extracurricular 
activities to deter drug use; drug and alcohol tests for railway employees to encourage 
safety; car stops at borders to intercept illegal immigrants; and sobriety checkpoints to 
remove drunken drivers from the roads.  With respect to automobiles, the holdings are 
mixed.  Random stops of automobiles to check drivers' licenses, vehicle registrations, and 
safety conditions were condemned as too intrusive.  The degree to which random stops 
advances the legitimate governmental interests involved did not outweigh the individual's 
legitimate expectations of privacy.37  While federal courts generally require that police 
demonstrate some kind of suspicion in order to perform a search, they grant some 
exceptions for searches that meet a specific need of the government.  The argument 
against random baggage searches claims that police are looking for a needle in a 
haystack.  By law, the searches would have to include every subway stop at random and 
random stops of individuals.  Strict enforcement means randomly searching potentially 
millions of commuters.  This practice is not a crime prevention tool; it is merely a way 
for law enforcement to appear tough on terrorism. 
 
C. WHAT IS NOT WORKING 
An examination of the anti-search side repeats an argument dating back to 
colonial times and a quote by Benjamin Franklin.  “They that can give up essential liberty 
to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”  According to many 
anti-search supporters, freedoms surrendered to police in random searches do not reduce 
terrorism.  According to the New York Civil Liberties Union, random searches are 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  In addition, observers speculate that random 
searches have no meaningful value in preventing terrorists from planting explosive 
devices onto the system.  Furthermore, arguments against random searches point to police 
engaging in what are seen as futile attempts to secure mass transit, since the odds of 
stopping a bomber are extremely remote based on how the current system operates.   
 
 
                                                 
37 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.  649 (1979).     
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Although random baggage searches have been upheld in court, they are contrary to 
societal norms, current screening is random, or it is ineffectively based on profiles and 
physical attributes of an individual.   
 
D. SUMMARY 
In Chapter IV, I examined why there is a need to change the way in which United 
States transit agencies screen for terrorist indicators.  The heart of the reason to change is 
the Fourth Amendment, concerning unreasonable search and seizure.  The American 
commuter has entrusted mass transit police agencies with their safety while on subway 
systems.  Randomly searching bags has not detected a terrorist bomb, but it has eroded 
the trust between the police and citizens.   
The next chapter focuses on implementing a potential solution of being strong on 
preventing terrorism and building a greater partnership with the community.  Behavioral 
Observation Screening System is a way to prevent terrorist acts by focusing on a potential 
terrorist’s behavior, in both the planning stage of an attack and the operational period of 




V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: BEHAVIOR OBSERVATION 
SCREENING SYSTEM 
Using BOSS behavior analysis, document analysis, and interview techniques, 
opportunities exist to detect the terrorist or other person with hostile intent without regard 
to the presence of a weapon and without regard to the nature of the activities being 
carried out.  BOSS represents a low-cost procedure using regular police/security patrols 
to detect persons who are high-risk through observation of behavior and mannerisms and 
simple, non-custodial, non-threatening interviews of the public.  BOSS employs concepts 
adapted to the legal, political, social, financial and resource limitations of the United 
States that have made El Al (Israeli Airline) the most secure in the world.  The 
Washington Post describes these concepts as “the world’s most sophisticated screening 
system.”38  BOSS takes into account concepts utilized in Israeli and US aviation security, 
such as the Computer - Assisted Passenger Prescreening II program, Behavioral 
Awareness Security Screening, and transforms the principles into an acceptable model for 
surface mass transportation.  BOSS does not use racial or ethnic appearance as a factor of 
suspicion.  It relies on behavioral, document and statement analysis for determination of 
risk, as opposed to a pre-determined “profile” of what a terrorist looks and sounds like.  
BOSS contains many positive attributes for law enforcement and for the public.   
Behavior Oriented Screening System (BOSS) incorporates a method of 
interactions between police and the public, based on voluntary encounters.  BOSS 
attempts to determine whether increased suspicion or reasonable suspicion exists that an 
individual is involved in planning or carrying out a terrorist act based upon behavior; 
non-racial appearance; conduct in response to law enforcement presence and questioning; 




                                                 
38 “Man Refused Entry May Have Been 9/11 Plotter,” The Washington Post,  sec. A, January 21, 
2004, A02.  
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A. THE LAW AND BOSS 
BOSS works on the premise of increased suspicion.  Increased suspicion is more 
than a hunch, but less than the reasonable suspicion required to detain a person for 
criminal investigation.  Facts that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that an 
individual is attempting to conceal intent or criminal activity fall into the category of 
increased suspicion.  BOSS permits and encourages law enforcement to have greater 
interaction with the public.  Officers conduct an interview and ask questions designed to 
confirm or dispel increased suspicion based on the officers’ preliminary observations of 
the person and examination of identification documents.  BOSS is not an interrogation 
but a voluntary and cordial conversation with the person.  Officers using BOSS must 
consider their obligation to enforce the law within the constitution and laws of the United 
States, the State of Pennsylvania and SEPTA Transit Police Department Directives.   
The judiciary decided several cases that permit United States law enforcement to 
initiate BOSS.  The case of U.S. v. Mendenhall39 test for Fourth Amendment Seizures, 
for instance, defines a seizure as follows:  a person is seized only if in view of all the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he 
was not free to leave.  In the case of Florida v. Royer40, the United States Supreme Court 
rules, “Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely 
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is 
willing to answer some questions, (or) by putting questions to him if the person is willing 
to listen.”   
In Florida v. Bostick,41 the United States Supreme Court agrees the police 
practice of boarding buses and asking passengers for permission to search luggage 
without individualized suspicion is not a seizure.  Police do not affect a seizure merely by 
asking questions unless the circumstances of the encounter are sufficiently intimidating 
that a reasonable person would believe he is not free to walk away.  The request to 
                                                 
39 U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), http://supreme.justia.com/us/446/544/case.html 
[Accessed September 1, 2006]. 
40 U.S. v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), http://supreme.justia.com/us/460/491/case.html [Accessed 
September 1, 2006]. 
41 U.S. v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991),http://supreme.justia.com/us/501/429/case.html [Accessed 
September 1, 2006]. 
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examine identification during a voluntary encounter will not make the encounter a seizure 
provided the request is not made in an intimidating or coercive manner. 
 
B. WHY THE NEED FOR BOSS 
According to the FBI, Al-Qaeda and allied organizations are operating in 40 
American states, awaiting orders for terror attacks.  Since the FBI is confident that 
terrorist cells are on United States soil, we must develop a method to interdict the terrorist 
attack before it is carried out.  BOSS gives law enforcement the ability to recognize 
terrorist behaviors.  BOSS uses simple behavioral indicators that allow police to engage 
an individual who is in the planning stages of an attack.  Factors taken into consideration 
include: 
Table 1.   Behavioral Indicators 
Immediately flees area when observed Inquires about security 
Takes notes  Revisits same location 
Takes photos  Weak cover story if questioned 
 Works in groups of 2 or 3 
 
Table 1 lists pre-incident indicators and what behaviors law enforcement needs to 
recognize.  However, in order to identify possible terrorist activity, behaviors that 
represent an immediate danger or threat to security are displayed in Table 2.  In addition 
to the indicators of pre-operational exercises, there are also immediately recognizable 
behavior signs.  Israeli intelligence into the actions of suicide bombers shows that 
bombers exhibit the following behavioral factors that trained officers can sense and thus 






Table 2.   Behavioral Factors 
 
Bulky or inappropriate clothing for season Excessive use of cologne 
Exposed wires In a trance-like state 
Non-responsive to authoritative commands Pale face from recently shaved beard 
Shaved body hair Thousand yard stare 
 
 
C. BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION SCREENING SYSTEM TECHNIQUES 
The techniques of BOSS are easily broken down into key components of 
observational surveillance.  The BOSS process encompasses two steps: an initial scan 
and non-confrontational discussion.  The initial scan of persons involves an effort to 
discover unusual appearance or behavior that may indicate a high-risk person.  Officers 
familiar with the environment must detect what is unusual or suspicious.  A good police 
officer on the street knows the places on the beat, the people on the beat, the things 
people do on the beat and the times they do them.  The initial assessment of potential 
illegal/terrorist activity assumes that a person engaged in deception or in an act in which 
the person fears discovery will suffer mental stress, fear or anxiety manifested through 
involuntary physical and physiological reactions that serve to dissipate the stress, fear or 
anxiety.  A person on a terrorist mission may present an appearance that is inconsistent 
with other passengers using the station or may carry articles or baggage inconsistent with 
the nature of the facility.  A person engaged in surveillance or pre-attack planning may 
exhibit actions inconsistent with actual passengers and engage in specific actions related 







Table 3.   Possible Signs of Suspicious Activity 
 
Appears to be in disguise Appears to be in a trance 
Cold penetrating stare Exaggerated emotions or behaviors 
inappropriate to the location such as crying 
or excessive laughter to self 
Exaggerated yawning Excessive fidgeting, clock watching, head 
turning 
Improper attire Increased breathing 
Person appears to maintain covert ties with 
others 
Person avoids area uniformed officers who 
are patrolling 
Person avoids eye contact with uniformed 
officers 
Person displays an exceptional interest in 
security personnel, equipment, or 
procedures 
Repeatedly pats upper body Repetitively touches face 
Rigid posture with minimal body 
movement and arms close to sides 
Rubs or wrings hands 
Trembles Unusual nervousness or fear 
Unusual perspiration Wide-open eyes; “flashbulb eyes” 
 
An officer observing any of these factors can proceed with a non-confrontational 
discussion with the individual.  Non-confrontational discussion is the second step in the 
process of BOSS.  A trained SEPTA Police Officer should know what questions to ask 
prior to approaching the individual for non-confrontational discussion.  The purpose of 
the conversation is to dispel the officer’s increased suspicion.  The conversation must ask 
open-ended questions that seek to alleviate the officer’s reasons for the increased 
suspicion.  For example, should the individual be wearing improper attire for the weather, 
the officer may simply ask, “Hello, where did you get that type of coat?”  This tactic puts 
the potential terrorist on the defensive, since the officer’s actions are lawful and seek 
direct information.  Non-confrontational discussion with the individual targets increased 
suspicion, as well as the purpose of the individual’s destination or reason for travel on 
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SEPTA.  Since SEPTA provides transportation services to the entire southeast region of 
Pennsylvania, as well as New Jersey and Delaware, the public’s purpose for riding 
SEPTA is to travel to a particular place or event.  Focusing questions on the purpose of 
the trip allows officers to conduct non-custodial conversations with the public and to 
employ the principles of BOSS.  The simple act of asking open-ended questions provides 
an officer with non-verbal body language clues that may indicate deception on the part of 
the individual.  They can include:  
 
Table 4.   Non-Verbal Indicators of Deception 
 
Accelerated heart rate Adam’s apple jump  
Ambiguous or evasive response Delayed response 
Facial flushing Fast eye blink rate 
Gazes down, avoids eye contact (depending 
on ethnicity) 
Gestures do not match verbal message  
Repeats back question Stutters or stammers 
Sweats Clears throat  
Voice becomes higher in pitch  Yawns 
 
The non-confrontational conversation should dispel or confirm an officer’s 
suspicion and can lead to several outcomes.  The first outcome dispels increased 
suspicion and the individual is released.  In the second outcome, the individual is evasive 
and the conversation evolves into a Terry stop.  The term Terry stop originates from 
United States case law in Terry v. Ohio.  The court ruled police could stop an individual 
in a high crime area to ascertain the individual’s purpose for being in the area.  In the 
third scenario, increased suspicion evolves into probable cause to believe that a crime has 
been committed or is about to be committed, and the individual is subject to further 
police action and potential arrest.   
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Behavioral Observation Screening System can function as a valuable tool for 
SEPTA Transit Police since it operates on an individual’s behavior and actions, not on 
racial profiling.  Success is evident in the case of Richard Reid, the convicted “shoe 
bomber.”  On December 22, 2001, Reid attempted to ignite an IED in his sneakers on 
American Airlines Flight 63 flying from Paris to Miami.  The day before, ICTS security 
officials at the American Airlines ticket counter identified Reid by a “profile” at Charles 
de Gaulle airport.  He was subsequently denied boarding for several factors.  He had no 
luggage on his person, he purchased the ticket with cash, he had no verifiable address 
(destination), and his travel plans were vague.  Although Reid was permitted to board a 
later flight, his actions and behavior on the first attempt were thwarted.  BOSS, in 
conjunction with increased intelligence, assists SEPTA Transit Police Officers to protect 
the subway system from potential bombings and routine crime. 
The ability of trained law enforcement professionals to act on behavioral 
indicators can augment security in the United States subway systems.  However, we must 
undertake a more fundamental approach that involves more individuals than just transit 
police in order to influence the safety of United States subway systems.  Substantial gains 




Now that BOSS has been explained, and a screening procedure based on the 
behavior of a terrorist is available to law enforcement.  The next step is for mass transit 
agencies to utilize BOSS and the leads, and intelligence derived from BOSS to the 
advantage of the mass transportation community.  The following chapter will look at how 
mass transit agencies that use BOSS can effectively share intelligence and pre—incident 


























VI. ESTABLISHING A NORTHEAST TRANSIT CORRIDOR 
INTEGRATED INFORMATION SYSTEM 
A. INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS AND BACKGROUND 
Transit intelligence needs to reconstruct boundaries of poor cooperation and stove 
piping of intelligence by combining information sharing on multiple fronts.  Major 
terrorist attacks on subway systems abroad have been on the rise.  Russia, Spain, and 
England experienced devastating attacks on subway systems.  While all of the attacks 
were the work of Islamic fundamentalists fighting for different goals, the incidents reveal 
common ground and pre-incident indicators.  Terrorists conduct probes of the mass-
transit systems to determine the vulnerabilities of each system.  Their probes include 
video recording, photography and passenger counts at platforms and on trains, which 
requires loitering in mass transit systems for an extended period.42  The FBI’s Joint 
Terrorism Task Force and their Infraguard Program are currently available for 
information sharing on subway systems.  In Infraguard, critical infrastructure holders, 
mostly chemical and petroleum manufactures, share information on security and how to 
better protect their assets.  The JTTF does not focus on issues that are specific to mass 
transit, nor do they regularly take into account pre-incident indicators involved in mass 
transit.  The Bureau’s Infraguard program looks at pre-incident indicators; however, the 
program encourages strategic and long-term analysis of intelligence.  Infraguard only 
accepts information from transportation officials that is fed via a secure network to the 
FBI.  Infraguard analysts cull the information and only post, what the FBI believes is 
critical for securing the mass transit sector.  This solution only accounts for a small 
portion of information, and the time from tip to posting can last weeks.   
Mass transit agencies rely on intelligence developed by analysts who are not 
cognizant of mass-transit needs or diversity on a macro level.  By continuing this course 
of action, transit agencies do not retain a vested interest in developing intelligence or in 
how consumers of the intelligence supports the decision-making process as it relates to 
securing a mass-transit system. 
                                                 
42 Anthony DeToma and Vincent DeMarino, “Lessons Learned from Recent International Terrorist 
Attacks in London and Madrid,” Total Security  (2005): 1. 
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An alternative to accomplish the strategic goal of good intelligence collection and 
analysis is for mass-transit agencies to develop intelligence for each individual transit 
agency that is utilized only within that particular agency.  However, this option does not 
permit a broader analysis of current trends across the northeast region of the United 
States.  Thus, an agency will be vulnerable since they are only analyzing the intelligence 
focused on their system.  This option employs only reports derived from the mass transit 
agency.  The intelligence development or consumption does not incorporate public or 
stakeholder input. 
The need to develop and share information and intelligence between mass transit 
agencies in the United States has significantly escalated in the past two years.  The 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Police Department needs to spearhead efforts to 
establish information-sharing by the top transit agencies in the United States.  They must 
particularly focus on systems within the northeast megalopolis, which includes 
Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, New Jersey, New York City, and Boston.  United States 
mass-transit agencies must collaborate to develop a means to identify vital information 
including an exchange of intelligence for actionable outcomes.   
 
B.  THE SOLUTION: NETCII 
One potential solution involves a Northeast Transit Corridor Integrated 
Information (NETCII).  The mass-transit intelligence community must focus on human 
intelligence (HUMINT) gathering accumulated through police reports, transportation 
employees, and passengers of transportation systems.  This intelligence should be 
disseminated through basic tenets of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
(NCISP).   
The scope of how NETCII should be organized follows the guidelines of the 
NCISP.  Under NCISP, law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, adopts the 
minimum standards for intelligence-led policing and the utilization and/or management 
of an intelligence function.  Law enforcement seeks ways to enhance intelligence sharing 
efforts and fosters information-sharing by participating in task forces and state, regional 
and federal information-sharing initiatives.  The scope and nature of developing NETCII 
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develops a method to enhance intelligence and provides police management with a 
strategy to face the challenges associated with policing subway systems.  Promoting a 
safe and effective transit environment consists of a regional concept that leverages the 
strengths of local transit police and aggregates the information, which allows law 
enforcement to connect the dots before an attack is of great significance. 
The goal of NETCII develops and implements methodologies that provide transit 
systems (who service the majority of commuters in the Northeast corridor) a way to 
disseminate information to appropriate entities.  This method includes having the ability 
to communicate pre-incident indicators to all transit police in real time.  It is 
accomplished by database accessibility via computer to all transit police.  An important 
component of NETCII is the mobilization efforts to combine intelligence input from 
various sources that includes the customers of mass transit, the neighborhoods the transit 
serves and oversight groups.  With cooperation and input from the community, NETCII 
promotes a policy of openness when communicating with the public and all interested 
parties regarding the criminal intelligence process.  However, communication remains 
open only as long as it does not affect the security and integrity of the process.  This plan 
is designed to strengthen homeland security and foster intelligence-led policing.  In order 
to mobilize the public for accomplishing the goals of NETCII, appropriate outreach 
materials should be prepared and utilized by law-enforcement agency officials.  They 
must publicize and promote the concepts of standards-based intelligence sharing and 
intelligence-led policing, as contained within the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan, to their agency personnel and the communities they serve.  All agencies, 
organizations, and programs with a stake in sharing transportation criminal and pre-
incident indicators intelligence should actively recruit agencies with local, state, tribal, 
regional, and federal law enforcement and intelligence systems to connect to the 
nationwide sensitive but unclassified communications capability.  Without dissemination 
of the information collected, another stovepipe is created, a situation, which is already too 
prevalent within the IC.  The design of NETCII eliminates stovepipes and involves the 
public so that actionable intelligence can be gathered and disseminated to participating 
agencies.  The various agencies, organizations, and programs are encouraged to leverage 
the nationwide sensitive but unclassified communications capability, thereby expanding 
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collaboration and information.  Utilizing open databases that are not classified frees the 
exchange of ideas and eliminates the clutter of reading copious intelligence briefs that are 
unrelated to the mission of mass transit.  This accessibility prevents the extensive 
information overload that reduces intelligence analysis and dissemination efficiency.  
Results will include increased actionable intelligence and a greater understanding of 
situational awareness for the mass transit community. 
1. Pre-incident Indicators 
Transportation systems utilizing effective intelligence operations enable 
commanders at all levels to apply their forces wisely, efficiently and effectively to 
combat terrorism.43  Due to the close proximity of transportation service providers in the 
northeast corridor of the United States, providers must share information on who is 
engaging in behavior that may be of concern and potential trends and/or pre-incident 
indicators of an attack associated with these behaviors.  Some of the indicators include:  
• The theft or loss of badges, credentials, ID cards, 
government/military/emergency vehicles, uniforms or the discovery of 
false IDs.  Attempts to scout out seven hospitals in the United States in 
March and April of 2005 involved fake credentials and ID cards. 
• Photographing, sketching or surveillance of buildings and facilities  
• Trespassing near key facilities or in supposedly secure areas, particularly 
by multiple persons   
• The presence of uncommon or abandoned vehicles, packages or containers 
• Observing people who are searching trash containers or placing unusual 
items in them (particularly around transit systems or the lobbies of 
crowded buildings, but also around the private residences of important 
people).44 
 
A vital and shared security function for a mass transit agency is the collection of 
security information.  A strong data collection process coupled with intelligence sharing 
enables agencies to use resources more effectively by targeting high-profile events, 
                                                 
43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2000), vii. 
44 John Thompson, Waiting for the Kaboom: Indicators to Watch For (Toronto: privately printed, 
2005), 2, http://www.the mckenzieinstitute.com/ [Accessed September 8, 2005]. 
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identifying trends in potential pre-incident indicators and designing and testing 
countermeasures to combat potential attacks on mass transit. 
2. The Need for a Northeast Corridor Transit Intelligence Integration 
(NETCII)  
The need for NETCII is evident.  The FBI warns of potential attacks on soft 
targets in intelligence bulletins #51, 76, 88, 110, and 144.  Soft targets encompass areas 
where people congregate as well as United States mass-transit agencies.  In fact, senior 
al-Qaeda detainees indicate that their organization continues to be interested in striking 
mass-transit agencies in the United States since they perceive such attacks will cause fear 
within the public and affect the economy.  The Texas Transportation Institute supports 
this view in its Urban Mobility Study.  Without mass transit, the region of southeastern 
Pennsylvania faces local traffic delays that would increase by at least one-third, costing 
residents an additional $614 million dollars in lost time and fuel.45  As recently as May 
23, 2006, the Pottstown Mercury reported a plot by Pakistani immigrant Shahawar Matin 
Siraj to blow up the Herald Square New York Subway station on the eve of the 2004 
Republican National Convention.46  On Friday, July 7, 2006, the anniversary of the 
London Underground attacks, the Department of Homeland Security advised that a man 
remained in custody in Jordan for plotting to blow up the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey commuter tunnel, flooding Manhattan. 
3. Data collection 
Data collection is based on the requirements of an agency using the intelligence.47  
By transit agencies developing their own storage and formatting intelligence, they can 
dictate the utility of the data collection effort.  The arrangement of data within files 
largely determines the types of analysis performed and the utility of the collected data for 
deployment, decision-making, case clearance, and the design of effective 
countermeasures.  NETCII should focus on intelligence that enters the transit system in 
three ways: (1) reports from transit police patrol activity (2) reports from transit 
                                                 
45 Katie Turnbull, ed., “Urban Mobility Study,” Philadelphia Metropolitan Area Study, vol. 41 (2000): 
8. 
46 “NYC Subway Terror Plot Revealed,” Pottstown Mercury (Pottstown, PA), May 23, 2006, 2. 
47 Mark M.  Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 45. 
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employees and (3) reports from public (transit passengers/transit customers, 
transportation stakeholders, and crime victims). 
During patrol, transit police may observe criminal activity and cite or arrest 
offenders, assist passengers and maintain order on the system.  During these activities, 
transit police may issue citations or warnings; complete incident reports for contact with 
suspicious individuals or pedestrian investigations; perform other activities to track 
suspicious actions or persons; and complete patrol logs.  When issuing citations or 
warnings, or engaging in other patrol activities, transit police call dispatch to ensure that 
each case or citation is assigned a case number.  Furthermore, police notify police 
dispatch in the event of suspicious activities. 
Transit employees may also report suspicious activities or other occurrences 
either to the civilian in the control center (directs movement of trains), who will notify 
transit police dispatch, or directly to transit police dispatch.  In either case, a transit police 
officer is assigned to investigate the call. 
Transit employees may be asked to complete an incident form, sometimes 
referred to as an “unusual occurrence report.”  Transit passengers or the victims of crime 
may also report criminal activity to the control center, customer service or the transit 
police dispatch.  In the event of such an occurrence, a transit police officer investigates 
the report, processes the crime, and reassures the victim.  The vast majority of security 
information reported on a transit system by a dedicated police force passes through transit 
police dispatch.   
To capture information on actual incidents, transit police dispatchers initiate a 
“daily control log” (DCL) for all incidents.  The DCL, controlled by a standard computer-
aided dispatch system, assigns a case number to each call for service to ensure that the 
call can be tracked from its initial report up through case disposition, in the event a legal 
case should develop.  Transit police dispatchers track call-ins from municipal patrol 
officers, as well as assistance provided to transit passengers and employees.  Transit 
police dispatchers also perform warrant searches, notifications, and specific requests for 
information from local police.  In each case, a record of this activity is preserved in the 
form of the recorded phone call, dispatch log and in the 24-Hour Reports prepared for 
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both management and data collection and analysis purposes.  Transit police dispatchers 
maintain records on the number of bomb threats received at the transit agency and file 
completed bomb threat management checklists or other documentation on the incident.  
In response to a call for service, transit police officers investigate the incident and prepare 
an incident report and, if necessary, an investigative report.  These forms describe the 
incident, including such key information as the type of incident, time, list of witnesses, 
actions of perpetrator and victim and any contributing factors.  While investigating, 
officers collect incident evidence and establish a chain of custody for managing and 
storing evidence.   
Once the incident is reported, agencies cull it for collective analysis to determine 
the value of intelligence to individual agencies.  To perform intelligence analysis, transit 
police and civilian analysts review dispatch records, Incident and Supplemental Report 
Forms, Disposition/Arrest Forms and information provided by transit operations 
personnel.  Depending upon the level of cooperation with local police, transit crime 
analysts’ access information concerning criminal occurrences near and on transit property 
that may not have been reported to the agency, but shared through common reporting and 
established relationships such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the U.S. Attorney, or the 
Anti-terrorism Advisory Council. 
Utilizing and incorporating the customers of mass transit to provide immediate 
and real time intelligence to an operation resides at the heart of augmenting transit 
intelligence.  SEPTA moves over one million people per day in the greater Philadelphia 
area.  An additional one million sets of properly trained eyes and ears can forward pre-
incident indictors to the agencies that need operational intelligence.  Proper training and a 
reporting apparatus that provides reward-based tips for commuters represents the critical 
element in developing such massive mobilization.  In the spirit of cooperation, the United 
States mass-transit agencies must adopt methodologies that allow for information-sharing 
without restriction that can benefit the safety of the Nation.  Intelligence-sharing, 
instituted at a grassroots level, provides security to mass-transit systems.  One example of 
how intelligence can be supported and delivered to police and security forces is 
established in Project Griffin.   
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The United Kingdom, more specifically the London Metropolitan Police, 
attributes their success in responding to the 7/7/05 and 7/21/05 transit attacks by 
constantly drilling and preparing for terrorism related attacks.48  The City of London 
Police has developed Project Griffin49 to train security officers from major city 
organizations, Westminster and Canary Wharf.  Participants train in various disciplines 
so that staff members are better equipped to assist the police in the event of a major 
incident.  First, security officers attend a training day provided by the City of London 
Police special branch, and Metropolitan Police explosive officers give presentations.  
This training involves input on the current terrorist threat and an overview of the differing 
threat from other non-terrorist groups.  The training also covers the following key areas: 
• Emergency services command and control 
• Conflict and resolution 
• Hostile reconnaissance 
• Terrorist planning 
• Cordons and associated powers 
 
Second, training includes a bridge call facility for security managers, which 
consists of a conference call with information from the City of London Police 
Intelligence Bureau.  Using the bridge call facility, City Police update security officers 
about: 
• Current threat 
• Recent and current crime trends 
• Forthcoming events 
 
A pilot scheme featuring five, one-day courses was introduced in summer 2004, 
and more than 500 security officers were trained and presented with a Project Griffin 
certificate.  Each trained security officer receives a high-visibility fluorescent tabard, 
supplied and funded by the Corporation of London, the local authority for the city.  
                                                 
48 Michael Bowron, interview by author. 
49 “Project Griffin,” City of London Police, http://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/countering-
terrorism/terrorism-griffin.html [Accessed April 20, 2006]. 
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Officers use the tabards when employed on Project Griffin duties; they also have space 
for an individual agency logo.  The success of Project Griffin depends upon effective 
partnerships.  The training program is designed in conjunction with other emergency 
services, the main security industry bodies, and banking organizations.  It is supported by 
the security industry, city businesses, and the Corporation of London.  Project Griffin’s 
goals support cooperation, collaboration, and development of individuals who have a 
greater propensity to identify and notify police in the event of a terrorist attack. 
The United States can emulate the cooperation of Project Griffin.  They can 
develop an intelligence-sharing capability that enlists the eyes and ears of millions of 
commuters and thousands of transit employees who focus on pre-incident indicators in an 
effort to thwart terror campaigns on the United States subway systems.  This goal is 
discussed in the section on developing a robust intelligence sharing in the SEPTA system. 
Another example of how intelligence can work to the benefit of the SEPTA 
system can be found in the Israeli utilization of human intelligence.  The goal of the 
Israeli intelligence family is to gather information for operations and legal actions; 
identify potential threats from organizations or individuals; pinpoint sources and methods 
of financing; identify organizational infrastructures; and create threat analyses.  Emphasis 
on real-time information-sharing between agencies accomplishes their mission.  
Intelligence is geared toward actionable intelligence with a major reliance on human 
intelligence (HUMINT).50 
The Israeli public plays in important part in preventing terrorism.  Israeli citizens 
face the possibility of terrorist acts on a daily basis.  The average Israeli is more aware 
than citizens in the United States of suspicious individuals, packages, and actions that put 
them at risk.  Because of increased vigilance and awareness, ordinary citizens foil more 
than 80% of attempted terrorist attacks in Israel, including timed devices left at target 
sites.51  Israeli intelligence forces focus on stopping terrorist activity prior to target 
                                                 
50 Nadav Morag, “Homeland Security In Israel” (lecture, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 
February 3, 2006). 
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acquisition by disrupting plots to commit a bombing in the planning stages, financing 
stages or bomb-building stages.  This tactic has proved effective in reducing suicide 
bombings.52  Undercover units of the IDF and Mossad assassinate terrorist leaders and 
bomb makers and stop bombings in early stages.53 
While intelligence and citizen involvement play an important role in reducing 
terrorist success in Israel, the defense tactic of depth, or concentric rings of security, 
cannot be overlooked.  This concept uses police and security officials placed at strategic 
areas funneling to a single target area.  Israeli authorities define three levels or rings of 
security.  They include: (1) non-target area (2) pre-target area and (3) target area.54  
Defense in depth tactics, coupled with behavioral characteristics of bombers, allows 
Israeli security forces to thwart an attack prior to the target area, which in this case would 
be a crowded subway platform.   
Israel’s ability to focus on and adjust to terrorist tactics is unparalleled.  While 
Israel and the United Kingdom demonstrate relative success in combating terror, this 
thesis focuses on preventing terrorist bombings in the United States.  As a result, a 
parallel needs to be drawn between what the United Kingdom and Israel do within their 
respective government limitations, and what the United States can do within our civil 
rights and liberties and Constitutional limits.   
The examples of Project Griffin and the intelligence sharing of the Israelis are 
examined and developed into an effective strategy that SEPTA and all United States 
mass-transit providers can utilize.  The strategy emphasizes including the public in 
terrorism awareness, and it provides an effective means to communicate their 
observations to authorities.   
                                                 
52 Aaron Richmond  (Former Captain Israeli Security Forces-Jerusalem)  interview by author, 
February, 2006. 
 53 Jonathan B.  Tucker, “Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience,” 
Homeland Security (March 2003): 7. 
54 David W.  Brannan, Bruce Hoffman, Eric Herren, and Robert Matthiessen, Preparing for Suicide 
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Another successful grassroots campaign is the FBI collaboration with the 
Philadelphia Police and District Attorney’s Office to start “Step Up, Speak Up,”55 which 
provides a hotline and a resource guide for reporting violent crime in the region.  This 
program is considered a success in reducing witness intimidation.  Integrating the public 
into a campaign to reduce terrorism and providing constructive feedback and incentives 
to participate could result in an intelligence mechanism like no other in the United States. 
The greatest outreach for public input should be vested in individuals who are 
considered stakeholders in transit security.  In Philadelphia, valuable stakeholders such as 
the Building Office Managers Association (BOMA) have the ability to reach out to all of 
the high-rise office-building tenants in the region and push information down to the 
individual commuter level, as well as serve as a conduit from which information can flow 
back to SEPTA.  BOMA is particularly valuable since the majority of its employees and 
tenants use SEPTA.  In addition, many high-rise buildings in Center City are attached to 
or are adjacent to SEPTA infrastructure.  Associations such as the Delaware Valley 
Association of Rail Passenger (DVARP) complement BOMA’s efforts.  Membership in 
DVARP includes concerned citizens who work to improve the quality of mass transit.  
SEPTA and DVARP work together to establish a reporting mechanism that feeds 
information to SEPTA and the region but also returns information to the commuter.  A 
significant number of DVARP’s members falls into the category of railroad hobbyist.  
Railroad hobbyists typically spend their free time videotaping and recording trains as 
they traverse the United States.  Incorporating rail hobbyists into the intelligence-sharing 
process permits SEPTA and the region to pre-clear a hobbyist before one of them 
videotapes or records train information.  This strategy reduces nuisance calls and permits 
law enforcement to leverage local expertise that would help identify pre-incident 
indicators of terrorist activity. 
4. NETCII Concept in Action 
For NETCII to move forward, individual agency analysts must prepare monthly 
reports summarizing activity on their system for submission to the Northeast Transit 
Corridor Information Integration database.  In the best-case scenario, incident 
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information is immediately entered into NETCII as it occurs.  These incidents may 
include a transit employee loss or theft of their identification, a stolen bus, or an attempt 
to steal one.  Directly afterward, officers from all participating agencies can view the 
current operational picture for the transit community at large.  Analysts prepare reports 
evaluating the results of special programs or deployment strategies in conjunction with 
high profile incidents used to address special problems associated with transit. 
For individual transit agencies, the goals of NETCII intelligence collection are 
categorized as follows:  
• The collection and organization of intelligence to alert transit police of 
potential pre-incident indicators or commonalities on respective systems. 
• The provision of a decision-making aid for the deployment of transit 
police and security work force. 
• The organization of information to improve and test the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism countermeasures. 
• The presentation of intelligence to strengthen the position of the police or 
security department within the mass transit system. 
• The communication of intelligence to police commanders in order to 
influence passenger perceptions of system security (deployment strategy). 
 
Transit police, security personnel and police management must identify three 
critical components of actionable intelligence, including the number and type of incidents 
occurring on the system, as well as the location and time of these incidents.  Finally, they 
must gather information on the underlying conditions surrounding the occurrence of these 
incidents. 
Intelligence analysts can collect data from the following readily available sources: 
• Dispatch logs 
• Operator reports 
• Incident report forms 
 
While none of these sources presents a complete picture by itself, in combination 
they enable the agency to obtain an accurate assessment of the crimes occurring on the 
system, as well as valuable information to improve both the deployment of police or 
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security personnel and the design of terrorism countermeasures.  The Northeast Corridor 
Transit Intelligence Integration can gather valuable intelligence from existing sources that 
enable intelligence sharing for managers in their decision-making process to prevent and 
deter terrorist activity on United States mass-transit assets.   
5. Impact 
The impact of a computer database such as NETCII dramatically increases 
situational awareness within the entire mass-transit community of the Northeast United 
States.  Supplemental information that improves the crime analysis processes but is non-
essential to a basic information system includes: 
• The impact of the incident on transit service 
• Information concerning other "quality of life" violations that may have 
been committed by the perpetrator of a serious incident prior to the 
incident 
• The attention/treatment of the patrons involved in the incident (victims 
and witnesses) 
 
The amount of information recorded in a NETCII dispatch log varies from system 
to system.  In most cases, however, effective monitoring of the dispatch log enables 
NETCII personnel relying on municipal police to establish an accurate assessment of 
serious incidents.  The dispatch log is particularly useful for NETCII police and security 
departments, as they must organize operations and record-keeping efforts in accordance 
with the NETCII dispatch system. 
For transit properties passing through several police jurisdictions, the dispatch log 
also provides a record of NETCII interaction with these municipal police agencies.  This 
information can be summarized in weekly or monthly reports that supplement the 
NETCII understanding of security problems.  It should be noted, however, that the 
dispatch log is not a comprehensive source for transit crime information.  While it 
identifies incidents, it offers no description of the incident or of the underlying 
circumstances that contributed to it.  Furthermore, the dispatch log does not identify 
“quality of life” issues, which discourage ridership.  Finally, the dispatch log does not 
provide data in sufficient detail to design countermeasures or to test their effectiveness.  
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For many transit providers, however, the dispatch log provides a valuable and 
preliminary assessment of NETCII crime. 
Since NETCII passengers, operators, conductors, or station personnel are often 
the only representatives of the NETCII present when a security incident occurs, they 
provide considerable information concerning the level of crime experienced by the 
system.  NETCII operators report security information in a variety of ways, including: 
• The ability to share information across the entire NETCII is critical to 
achieving success of the system.  As a result, using informal means to 
discuss crime (i.e.  weekly or monthly meetings, newsletters, union 
coordinators and support services or joint-committees) within the NETCII 
and implementing formal means to document incidents witnessed or 
experienced by the public and operators will place a positive outlook on 
NETCII and encourage greater cooperation.   
• NETCII requires operators to file formal reports and establishes incentive 
programs encouraging the public and operators to provide information on 
suspicious activities or crime matters.   
• Should a passenger provide critical information as deemed by the NETCII, 
a transit provider could opt to reward the tipster with a weekly or monthly 
pass.  Such an incentive encourages greater vigilance, bolsters a positive 
image of the transit provider, and gives the rider ownership of the system.   
 
Developing educational programs for the transit customer, stakeholder, and the 
public remains vital to giving individuals a stake in aiding in homeland security that 
affects rail transportation.   
Development of the Northeast Transit Corridor Integrated Information system 
provides all mass transit carriers with an operational awareness of the entire region.  The 
grass roots movement is already in place.  Transit systems need to tap into their 
passengers for their expertise in situational awareness on the rails.  Only after the 
community, employees, and transit providers work together will greater strides in 
effective intelligence be made.   
 
C. SUMMARY 
Identifying a terrorist in the pre-operational stages of an attack is important.  
However, if the agency that identifies a potential attack does nothing with the intelligence 
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the gains are not that great.  The establishment of NETCII allows mass transit agencies in 
the northeastern portion of the United States to effectively share intelligence so that all 
transit properties benefit from the efforts of counter terrorism program such as BOSS.  
Next, I will examine how transit properties can take BOSS and NETCII and implement 
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VII. IMPLEMENTING PREVENTIVE MEASURES ON MASS 
TRANSIT 
Effective prevention against terrorism requires the ability to provide an integrated 
information system that provides near real-time input to an alert database.  Transit police 
look at pre-operational indicators as they relate to transit in the entire Northeast Corridor 
of the United States.  The Northeast Transit Corridor Integrated Information (NETCII) 
allows real-time input from a massive mobilization of the public, employees, and transit 
police to generate and deposit intelligence into a workable database for transportation 
officials.   
The United States National Strategy for Homeland Security has identified six 
critical mission areas: 
• Intelligence and Early Warning 
• Border and Transportation Security 
• Domestic Counterterrorism 
• Protecting Critical Infrastructure & Key Assets 
• Defending Against Catastrophic Threats 
• Emergency Preparedness and Response 
 
All six of the National Strategies critical missions are directly impacted by 
implementing BOSS and NETCII.  Terrorists conduct pre-operational planning.  Their 
own operations provide opportunities to thwart attacks by using BOSS and NETCII.  
Integrating the customers of mass transit, employees, and the police creates an 
information network that garners public support.   
BOSS and NETCII improve intelligence and early warning by focusing not just 
the police but the entire transit community on looking for and reporting pre-incident 
indicators of terrorist activity.  Border and transportation issues are clearly addressed by 
implementation of BOSS and NETCII.  Philadelphia is an international port with mass 
transit services directly to the airport and to the seaport.  Proper intelligence collection 
and dissemination will not only make for safer transportation, but also safer international 
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borders.  The category of domestic counterterrorism falls within the scope of BOSS and 
NETCII in that no federal agency knows local security better than a local agency.  The 
SEPTA Transit Police Department, its employees and its daily commuters know what is 
normal and what is not normal.  BOSS and NETCII place counterterrorism into the hands 
of the local responders and stakeholders.  This strategy bodes well for augmenting 
security since everyone at a local level will have a hand in security.  BOSS and NETCII 
also protect critical infrastructure.  Transportation is identified as a tier II critical 
infrastructure.  An attack on mass transit would be devastating to the regional economy 
and national psyche.  However, giving passengers a stake in security increases security, 
not just for counterterrorism, but for all crimes.  An organization or region that shares 
intelligence prevents the tragedy of the commons, and works together to guard against 
catastrophic threats.  We have seen in past attacks multiple bombings on mass transit.  
Sharing pre-incident indicators aligns all mass transit in the fight on terror.  Broad 
implementation of BOSS and NETCII increases SEPTA’s and the entire region’s ability 
to prepare and to respond to terrorism.  Chapter VI discussed how the Israeli government 
uses their citizens effectively to combat terror by preparing them and giving the 
individual citizen a mission to report irregular events.  BOSS and NETCI serve as a 
tangible way to rapidly collect, analyze and disseminate information into actionable 
intelligence.  The result is a safer transit environment that maintains the freedoms of 
American society, while reducing the potential for terrorist bombings on subway systems.   
 
A. ANALYSIS 
Transportation systems utilizing effective intelligence operations enable 
commanders at all levels to apply their forces wisely, efficiently and effectively to 
combat terrorism.56  Implementing the information-sharing plan opens new lines of 
business.  Transportation managers and security officials work hand-in-hand to identify 
potential problems and attempt to resolve issues on a regional basis.  The strengths of 
integrated information sharing include greater buy-in, attention to issues and reduction of 
stovepipes in transit-based intelligence and eliminating the weak link in terrorism 
prevention.  All too often, a terrorist alert concerning mass transit is put out, and an 
                                                 
56 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 
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agency increases police or security presence and implements strong operational plans to 
thwart an attack.  Conversely, just down the line, another transit property does little or 
nothing to augment security.  A tragedy of the commons57 results in that the weak link 
does nothing and becomes the target, but all United States mass-transit suffers decreased 
ridership.  The airline industry provides a clear example of this reality, because they are 
just returning to pre 9/11 attack ridership.58  Another benefit is that the integrated 
intelligence works on behavior with no adverse impact on the rights and freedoms of 
Americans.   
A strong data-collection process coupled with intelligence sharing enables 
agencies to use resources more effectively.  They target high-profile events, identify 
trends in potential pre-incident indicators and design, and test countermeasures to combat 
potential attacks on mass transit.  Data collection results directly from the requirements of 
an agency using the intelligence.59  Transit agencies that develop their own storage and 
formatting of intelligence dictate the utility of the data collection effort.  Transit agencies, 
working in concert to produce and consume intelligence, remove the barrier between 
policy makers and the intelligence community and enhance provision of intelligence for 
real world situations.60 
Integrated Information for the Northeast Corridor decreases time spent waiting for 
vital information and allows transit agencies to move more expeditiously toward the 
operations phase.  A marked increase in operational efficiency will result, since leads that 
appear trivial on the surface or reports of suspicious behavior are often dismissed because 
labor is not available to investigate.  However, combining the forces of the entire 
Northeast Corridor multiplies the effectiveness, i.e., there is economy of scale and the 
cost of conducting intelligence operations in a vacuum is decreased.  Greater customer 
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appreciation and relations ensues.  Since the campaign is designed as a mobilization of 
the public to “see something, say something,” public participation is vital for success.  
Currently, many Americans feel all they can do is wait for the next attack.  By 
implementing integrated information, the public can take ownership and provide vital 
intelligence to responsible parties in mass transit. 
While mobilizing the transit workforce remains a valid and necessary step in 
accomplishing the strategic goal, a more comprehensive option jointly mobilizes the 
work force and the ridership of the mass-transit community.  NETCII supports an option 
that entails a mobilization of the entire transit community.  The need to implement an 
innovative program is obvious.  More eyes and ears monitoring the system reduce crime 
in general while providing the community with a viable and actionable part to play in 
securing the homeland.   
The goal reduces the probability of a terrorist bombing on the SEPTA Transit 
System by combining the efforts of the Authority’s employees, all of whom have a stake 
in protecting the system.  Another end added benefit would be the overall reduction of 
serious crime in SEPTA.  
The recommended solution to the quandary of mass-transit security develops the 
Northeast Transit Corridor Integrated Information (NETCII) and trains transit police in 
BOSS.  By combining intelligence resources from the major transit providers, 
administrators develop counterterrorism practices and recognize the overall trends in 
transit as it affects counterterrorism operations.  Utilizing established reporting methods 
by transit police, employee special reports, and customer reports supports an exchange of 
information, which is a proven method.  Therefore, a collection system for the 
intelligence already exists.  Sharing and analyzing intelligence strengthens transportation 
infrastructure by permitting a focused examination of the activity coupled with an in-
depth understanding of transit operations. 
A mobilization and outreach to stakeholders is crucial for accomplishing the 




Delaware Valley Association of Rail Passengers works in conjunction with SEPTA to 
provide rider awareness tips and advocates on behalf of the public to make mass transit 
more accessible.   
Working with organizations such as DVARP, SEPTA can prove that police have 
effectively reduced crime from 1991 to 2004 by over 93 percent.  This statistic is 
significant since SEPTA moves over one million passengers per day.  Many passengers 
embark and disembark at the same station on a daily basis; they are aware of their 
surroundings and can serve as additional eyes and ears for the mass-transit provider.  
SEPTA can support a link from their homepage that gives a one half-hour tutorial on 
passenger safety and awareness.  Additionally, if permissible, employers that use transit 
check and DVARP could support a similar link that gives passengers an awareness of 
their surroundings and a means to report incidents to SEPTA Police.  SEPTA can further 
disseminate information to the public through educational brochures that are handed out 
when a customer purchases a transpass or tokens at authorized sales locations.  As a 
result, information is given directly to individuals that have invested in the transit system, 
since they have made a commitment to ride it. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
An examination into what SEPTA considers a critical success factor is found in 
its mission statement, “…to provide safe, reliable, and on time service to the residents of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania.”  Without being able to provide safe and reliable service, 
SEPTA would not be in business.  SEPTA has a reputation for being on time and 
reinforce this reputation by giving customers a 10-minute guarantee.  If a customer is not 
delivered to their desired destination within ten minutes of the scheduled time and 
SEPTA is at fault (mechanical breakdown, signal problem, overhead wire problem, etc.), 
SEPTA reimburses the cost of the trip.  This practice represents a strength of SEPTA.  
SEPTA retains a distinctive core competency in that they are the only transit provider in 
Southeastern Pennsylvania.  Without SEPTA, many businesses and commerce in the 
region would falter.  The focus of this benchmarking includes developing a continuous 
process for evaluating the information gained by the Northeast Transit Corridor 
Integrated Information Center, and how the information is pushed to other agencies on 
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pre-operational indicators and crime patterns.  The ability to evaluate crucial information 
and provide operational intelligence that promotes a safe and reliable transit environment 
remains crucial to the success of NTCII.  The exchange of information permits officers to 
make better decisions on the street as it affects the safety of passengers.  What was once 
seen as an isolated incident in Philadelphia of a male videotaping the transit system could 
now be passed to an officer in Washington D.C. who has observed the same male 
engaging in the same activity in or near the same vicinity or at different vicinities.  
Because of this exchange, the proverbial “dots” could be connected prior to an incident 
and a terrorist attack thwarted during pre-operational stages.   
The primary goal of the police departments for major mass transit properties is 
strengthened intelligence sharing, more flexible patrol initiatives, and a change in transit-
policing mindset.  United States mass-transit police departments prevent the use of 
terrorist bombings on trains and platforms by taking decisive and proactive measures.  
The top mass-transit agencies service one million passengers or more by both bus and rail 
on a daily basis.  These top transit agencies retain dedicated law-enforcement 
professionals who can be utilized to reduce the potential of suicide terrorists or incidents 
of bombings on their respective properties.  Transit police departments and the entire 
transit community need to embrace the use of community involvement and education in 
reducing terrorism.  Employee involvement and awareness must be augmented to reduce 
the likelihood of terrorist incidents on mass-transit, since typically there are more 
transportation officials and passengers than police.  The Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority seeks to implement the Northeast Transportation Corridor 
Intelligence Initiative (NETCII), an initiative that looks to generate a massive public 
mobilization for reporting pre-incident indicators associated with terrorist activity and 
reporting other, possibly criminal incidents to the entire northeast transit corridor.   
In the northeast transit corridor, transportation providers are inextricably linked to 
each another.  On May 26, 2006, the entire transit service from Boston to Washington 
D.C. was halted due to a power failure.  The same scenario would be true of a terrorist 
bombing in the corridor.   
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Community policing represents the foundation of most metropolitan police 
departments for the past 20 years.  Using community policing as a backbone, mass transit 
police agencies can implement NETCII and recruit passengers to serve as eyes and ears 
of the department.  In order to garner public support and participation, SEPTA will turn 
to one of its sternest critics in the Delaware Valley Rail Passenger Association.  DVRPA 
consists of community leaders, business owners, and passengers who advocate on behalf 
of the passenger to SEPTA.  DVRPA advocates on behalf of passengers for seat size and 
scheduling, always in an adversarial manner with SEPTA.  The goal is to have a leader in 
the area, as well as a dissenter in many ways, to collaborate with SEPTA and to develop 
an intelligence stream that will benefit all participants. 
Every major transit system dispatches a transit employee aboard a train or in a 
station to serve as additional eyes and ears for the police.  Training transportation 
employees in pre-incident indicators can be accomplished during mandatory yearly 
training for these employees.  The training focuses on behavioral indicators that 
employees may observe while engaging in normal duties.   
Developing BOSS as the standard patrol protocol is supported by the fact that 
visible security patrols are proven as an effective deterrent to terrorist attack.  For 
example, on August 31, 2004, officials in Moscow reported that a female suicide bomber 
had observed law enforcement checking documents and individuals at the entrance to the 
station.  This action “scared” the bomber and she retreated into the crowd and blew 
herself up prior to getting on the train.61  Developing greater intelligence and training 
officers to be more proactive reduces the likelihood of terrorist bombings.  However, the 
training needs to become an innate component to patrol procedures and specific policies 
must be developed to support a “hunter” approach to homeland security rather than a 
“fisherman” mind-set.62  This mindset can be accomplished by utilizing BOSS to 
SEPTA’s benefit.  Officers must actively seek out potential terrorist activity and act 
promptly on their instincts to reduce the threat.  In Israel, this method of providing 
                                                 
61 Peter Baker, "Suicide Bombing Kills 10 Outside Moscow Subway," Washington Post, sec. Foreign 
Services, September, 1 2004, 10. 
62 Bruce Hoffman, "Defending America Against Suicide Terrorism." 
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awareness to community, employees, and law enforcement reduces the success of suicide 
terrorists reaching their targeted objective.   
The driving force behind the plan is collection and timely reporting of pre-
incident indicators and anomalies on mass transit, as well as the patrol awareness of 
individual officers and commuters.  It is incumbent that reports received by public and 
transit employees are entered into a database that is accessible by all police units in the 
field.  To accomplish this, the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES), 
developed by DHS, should push information to units in the field and augment the 
operational picture in mass transit.  These initiatives will no doubt be challenged by new 
technology that claims to be able to counter terrorist bombings.  However, the proposed 
initiatives focus on the use of people, our most valuable resource, to take a stake in our 
security.  By using individuals who have the ability to adapt to situations, security is 
augmented in places where technology does not exist.  On August 27, 2005, in Dagestan, 
Russia, perpetrators placed an explosive device on the subway tracks and derailed a train.  
With proper training, engineers know what to look for and help avoid such incidents.  
Another anticipated challenge to the initiatives is community support.  Passengers on 
mass transit have a stake in their security.  The public, however, cannot be expected to 
assist in identifying possible terrorist activity and potential hazardous devices unless we 
provide effective communication means for them to do so.  When a call is relayed to 
police, the call must elicit a rapid and visible response from police.63  This commitment 
expands on our ongoing community-policing strategy and fosters greater public trust in 
mass transit. 
The development of community involvement, employee involvement, and police 
response is not just a response to terrorism.  The proposed initiatives serve a dual 
purpose.  First, the crime rate drops because of the initiatives.  Second, ridership 
flourishes because we are providing a safe and secure environment for individuals to 
commute.  The success of NETCII takes into account the public perception that the entire  
 
 
                                                 
63 Brian Jenkins, Keeping America's Mass Transportation System Safe: Are the Laws Adequate? 
(Washington, D.C.: Rand, 2004), 3. 
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transit authority is engaged in security and is genuinely concerned about providing a safe 
and effective environment.  The facts set forth within this thesis support safe and secure 
transit in all facets. 
The effort to reduce the threat and impact of terrorism bombings on subway 
systems in the United States requires the development of a unique plan that brings 
together police, transportation employees, and the public.  Implementing intelligence-led 
policing techniques expands the ability of all transit agencies located in the northeast 
corridor to reduce crime and improve quality of life issues within their jurisdiction.  It 
helps to identify pre-incident terrorist activity and to provide homeland security to 
surface transportation.  Increasing relationships between transit police, transit employees, 
and transit commuters related to homeland security issues increases the possibility that 
suspicious actions or conditions will be reported. 
Intelligence is a complex process through which agencies collect process, analyze, 
disseminate, and plan their respective operations.64  Training police officers, transit 
employees, and commuters who have a stake in transit security remains a paramount 
goal.  By incorporating BOSS and awareness training to all aspects of transportation 
security, the goal of a safer subway system can be realized.  The development of NETCII 
streamlines and provides actionable intelligence for administrators who have a stake in 
securing mass transit.  Implementing NETCII eliminates stovepipes, as they currently 
exist in the intelligence community for mass transit.  NETCII provides timely and 
accurate intelligence that previous intelligence sources were unable to provide and 











                                                 


























This thesis started out to examine how United States Mass Transit Agencies could 
prevent terrorist bombings on subway systems.  In the course of the analysis, it concluded 
that surface transportation is one of the most attractive soft targets for terrorist bombings.  
The examples of deadly terrorist bombings on surface transportation abound from all 
over the world.  Another conclusion is that currently there is not enough funding for 
surface transportation security from the Department of Homeland Security, in order to 
prevent bombings on surface transportation, particularly subway systems.  While 
presented with the problem of bombings and lack of funding the analysis, the thesis also 
concluded that any endeavor in securing mass transit must take into account the freedoms 
of Americans and the difficulties that arise in trying to maintain an open and accessible 
mass transit system in the face of global terrorism.   
In the end, I suggested how two new approaches - BOSS and NETCII - could be 
effectively implemented to develop greater operational intelligence on terrorist behaviors, 
and information sharing.  BOSS, an innovative training program that focuses on training 
police officers in behavioral actions of terrorists in pre-operational as well as operational 
stages of an attack, and the NETCII that takes human driven intelligence derived from 
BOSS and shares the information with all transit properties on the Northeast corridor.   
These new approaches will increase the security of mass transit subway systems.  
Implementing BOSS and NETCII will not violate individual’s rights, it will fight terror 
by engaging the community, help fight against the fear that incidents create, and share 
intelligence on a broader scale than is currently possible.  This thesis has looked a 
mounting problem in the world of mass transit and put forth two program initiatives that 
provide clear and effective alternatives to the ways in which U.S. security forces, 
including transit police departments, are currently trying to prevent terrorist bombings on 
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